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SELF-CONTAINED SELF-RESCUER FIELD EVALUATION: 
FIFTH-PHASE RESULTS
By Nicholas Kyriazi  and John P. Shubilla1    2
ABSTRACT
A joint effort by the Pittsburgh Research Center (PRC)  and the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA)3
was undertaken to determine how well self-contained self-rescuers (SCSR's), deployed in accordance with Federal
regulations (30 CFR 75.1714), held up in the underground environment with regard to both physical damage and
aging.  This report presents findings regarding laboratory-tested SCSR's in the fifth phase of testing from mid-1993
to early 1996.  The SCSR's were tested on human subjects and on a breathing and metabolic simulator (BMS) at
PRC.  These results indicate that most of the apparatus, if they pass their inspection criteria, perform satisfactorily.
2
     Figure 1.—Brea thing and metabolic simulator (BMS) at the Pittsburgh
Research Center, Bruceton, PA.
INTRODUCTION
On June 21, 1981, U.S. coal mine operators were required by
Federal law to make available to each underground coal miner a
self-contained self-rescuer (SCSR).  The regulations at 30 CFR
75.1714 require that each person in an underground coal mine
wear, carry, or have immediate access to a device that provides
respiratory protection with an O  source for at least 1 h, as rated2
by the certifying agencies—the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the Mine Safety
and Health Administration (MSHA).  The Pittsburgh Research
Center (PRC) is working jointly with MSHA in a long-term
evaluation of SCSR's now deployed in U.S. underground coal
mines.  This work is in support of PRC’s Disaster Prevention
research program to improve safety for underground mine
workers.  In this joint study, MSHA's responsibility is to locate
mines willing to participate and to procure from those mines the
SCSR's to be tested.  PRC replaces those SCSR's with new
apparatus and tests the deployed SCSR's in its laboratories.  The
objective of this long-term project is to evaluate the in-mine
operational durability of SCSR's.  Of utmost concern is the
successful performance of any SCSR that passes its inspection
criteria.  PRC is interested only in apparatus that pass their
inspection criteria.  Such apparatus must function successfully to
enable a miner to escape safely during a mine emergency.
Apparatus that fail inspection criteria are expected to be removed
from service.
This study involves testing approximately 100 SCSR's in each
phase.  This report describes findings in the fifth phase of testing
occurring from mid-1993 to early 1996.  Previous reports
describe phases 1 through 4 (1-3).   Testing was con- ducted4
using a breathing and metabolic simulator (BMS) (figure 1) and
human subjects on a treadmill.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The SCSR's tested were manufactured by CSE orp. (AU-9A1 manufacturers in the design of new apparatus.  Ninety percent of
and SR-100), Draegerwerk AG (OXY-SR 60B), Mine Safety the apparatus were tested on the BMS; 10%, on human subjects.
Appliances Co., Inc. (MSA), (Portal-Pack) and Ocenco, Inc. One MSA Portal-Pack test was discarded because of instrument
(EBA 6.5).  The SCSR’s were sampled according to estimated problems.
market share (table 1).  These devices are pictured in figures 2
through 6.  Some of the first-generation SCSR’s are no longer
being used underground (MSA 60-min SCSR and PASS 700);
others are being phased out (CSE AU-9A1 and Draeger OXY-SR
60B).  The service life of the CSE AU-9A1 expired during this
phase, so that we were able to obtain only part of our target
number of units for testing.  We included apparatus being phased
out because information that we ob- tain about these 15-year-old
a p p a r a t u s  m a y  h e l p  t h e
     Italic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references at the4
end of this report.
Table 1.—Self-contained self-rescuers received for evaluation
Apparatus Quantity tested
CSE AU-9A1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CSE SR-100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Draeger OXY-SR 60B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
MSA Portal-Pack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Ocenco EBA 6.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3
Figure 2.—Cased and uncased CSE AU-9A1 self-rescuer.
Figure 3.—Cased and uncased CSE SR-100 self-rescuer.
Figure 4.—Cased and uncased Draeger OXY-SR 60B self-rescuer.
Figure 5.—Cased and uncased MSA Portal-Pack self-rescuer.
Figure 6.—Cased and uncased Ocenco EBA 6.5 self-rescuer.
The O  constant-flow rate is checked on compressed-O2      2
apparatus; the NIOSH-required flow is 1.5 L/min at ambient
temperature and pressure (at NIOSH in Morgantown, WV), dry
(ATPD).
All apparatus are checked for breathing circuit leak-tightness
after opening.  The leak test used is that recom-mended for the
CSE AU-9A1 by the manufacturer; this test is identical to that
required by Draeger for its BG-174 rescue breathing apparatus.  It
is performed to determine how well the apparatus isolates the user
from the environment, which is assumed to be irrespirable.
Passing the test, however, is not a requirement of the regulations.
The test permits a decay in breathing circuit pressure from &70 to
&60 mm H O in 1 min.  This is equivalent to a leak rate of2
approximately 1 mL/min (all volumes at standard temperature and
pressure, dry, unless otherwise stated) given an internal volume for
both the apparatus and test stand of 1 L.  To give this some
perspective, an in-leakage rate of 1 mL/min in a 10% CO
atmosphere during a peak inhalation flow rate of 89 L/min, which
occurs in the BMS workload, would result in a 1-ppm
concentration of CO in the inhalation gas stream.  The 8-h
threshold limit value for CO is 50 ppm.  The Draeger/CSE leak
test, therefore, can be considered very conservative.
4
MSHA selected the participating mines with regard to type of The stressors monitored were inhaled levels of CO  and O ,
mining operation and SCSR deployment mode in order to obtain end-of-breath inhalation wet- and dry-bulb temperatures, and
a representative cross section of U.S. mines.  De-ployment modes inhalation and exhalation peak breathing pressures in both the
sampled were— BMS and treadmill testing.  In the treadmill testing, minimum
C Permanently stored (42%); inhaled levels of CO  and maximum inhaled levels of O  were
C Single-shift, carried and stored (24%); measured.  In the BMS testing, however, average inhaled levels of
C Stored on a mining machine (rubber-tired coal shuttle, both CO  and O  were measured.  Average inhaled gas levels
locomotive, or man-trip) (21%); and include the effect of apparatus dead space, whereas minimum
C Single-shift, belt-worn (13%). values of CO , for example, are only the lowest level of gas
Mine types sampled were conventional (28%), continuous (64%),concentration during inhalation.  The BMS measures average
and longwall (8%). inhaled values by electronically summing all of the CO  and O  of
The BMS test consisted of the average metabolic work rate ach inhalation cycle, weighted by the instantaneous flow rate.
exhibited by the 50th-percentile miner weighing 87 kg while The BMS also measures minimum inhaled CO  levels.
performing the 1-h man test 4 as described in 42 CFR 84.  The Tests on the BMS were terminated upon exhaustion of
BMS metabolic workload is presented in table 2.  The CO the O  supply as indicated by negative pressures reaching2
production rate was increased to 1.30 L/min from 1.10 L/min in -200 mm H O coinciding with an empty breathing bag.  Treadmill
the previous several phases.  This was done to reflect the finding tests were terminated in the same manner or if inhaled minimum
that our new set of human test subjects had higher such rates than CO  levels reached 4%, if maximum O  levels fell below 15%, or
our previous test subjects.  In the treadmill testing, the subjects if the test subject stopped because of subjectively high breathing
walked at whatever speed and grade resulted in an O pressures or temperatures.2
consumption rate of 1.35 L/min.  The CO  production rate,2
ventilation rate, and respiratory frequency varied among human
test subjects; these are listed in table 3.
Table 2.—BMS metabolic workload
O  consumption rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L/min . .2 1.35
CO  production rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L/min . .2 1.30
Ventilation rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L/min . . 30.0
Tidal volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L per breath . . 1.68
Respiratory frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . breaths per min . . 17.9
Peak respiratory flow rate:
Inhalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L/min . . 89.0
Exhalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L/min . . 71.0
2  2







2      2
Table 3.—Human subject workloads in treadmill tests
  Subject
VCO , V , RF,2
L/min L/min breaths per min
e
A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.25 31 26
B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.18 22 10
C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.35 25 10
D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.15 30 9
VCO  = CO   production rate.2  2
V   = Ventilation rate.e
RF = Respiratory frequency.   
TEST RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Experience with each model of apparatus is discussed Missing data points for wet-bulb temperature indicate equip-ment
separately.  The minute-average values of the monitored stressors malfunction.
were averaged over the entire test duration and are presented The Wilcoxon rank-sum test was performed for each monitored
graphically (figures 7 through 11) for each apparatus by stressor. stressor to determine whether the deployed units behaved
The values for new units tested on the BMS can be compared with differently from new units.  It tests the hypothesis that the two
the values for deployed units tested on the BMS and, to some samples are from populations with the same mean.  The values
extent, with deployed units tested on human subjects on afrom both samples are ranked in ascending order of magnitude.  If
treadmill, which are plotted afterward.  Because human subjects the sum of the ranks of the smaller sample (T) (in this case, new
may differ from each other and from the BMS in terms of VCO , units) falls within the acceptable range for the given sample sizes,2
V , and respiratory frequency, all of which affect apparatus then there is not sufficient evidence at the specified probabilitye
duration as well as all of the monitored stressors, these tests cannot level (P ' 0.05, two-sided) to say that the means of the two
be considered equivalent to the BMS tests even though the O samples differ.  The rank-sum test does not rely upon the2
c o n s u m p t i o n  ra te  is  the same.  assumptions that either the new- or deployed-unit 
5
Figure 7.—CSE AU-9A1 test results.
6
Figure 8.—CSE SR-100 test results.
7
Figure 9.—Draeger OXY-SR 60B test results.
8
Figure 10.—MSA Portal-Pack test results.
9
Figure 11.—Ocenco EBA 6.5 test results.
10
data are normal distributions or that they have identical variances, treadmill tests than in the BMS tests.  These could be caused by
as does the t-test for two populations of independent samples.  One higher bed resistances or higher peak flow rates in the human test
limitation of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is that it does not subjects than in the BMS.  At the end of the first treadmill test,
distinguish between large and small differences in values.  The human subject A was experiencing minimum inhaled CO  levels
results of the two-sided, P ' 0.05, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are of 3.6%, with unmeasured average inhaled levels even higher.
presented in table 4.  The probability of T, the rank sum of the new Higher ventilation rates caused by the elevated CO  levels is a
units, falling outside the given range is 0.05 if the populations havereasonable explanation for these high breathing pressures.  The
the same mean. second treadmill test pressures were even higher, but these occurred
CSE AU-9A1 rates are higher than those of the BMS or the chemical bed had
Three of seven deployed apparatus passed the leak-tightness than-average pressures, which cannot be attributed to higher
test, and all three new units passed. ventilation rates.  The apparatus for BMS test 15 had been carried
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for the inhalation and ex-halation into the mine and set on a mining machine daily, but six others
peak pressures showed higher values for new than deployed units were as well.  This does not mean, however, that all units deployed
(table 4).  If this is the result of settling of the chemical absorbent, in a certain way were subjected to equivalent shock and vibration.
the inhaled CO  values might be expected to be higher due to air This particular unit may have suffered greater environmental2
channeling, and they are (table 4 and figure 7), but not statistically impact than the others, or it may have been different in
significantly higher. manufacture.  The inhalation pressure reached our normal negative-
All of the apparatus tested on the BMS, new and deployed, pressure termination limit of &200 mm H O at 58 min.
reached 4% CO  (average inhaled) before the O  supply was Termination was called, instead, when the bag was flat.2     2
expended (table 5); one occurred before 60 min.  They were
permitted to continue until the O  supply was expended.  The one DRAEGER OXY-SR 60B2
apparatus tested on a human subject (subject B) reached 4%
(minimum inhaled) just as the O  supply became expended.  This Eighteen of nineteen deployed and two of three new units2
better performance can be explained by the fact that subject B had passed the leak-tightness test.
a VCO  of only 1.18 L/min compared with the 1.30 L/min of the The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests showed that both the wet- and2
BMS.  The CO -absorbent canister is simply undersized comparedry-bulb temperatures of new units border on being sig-nificantly2
with the O  supply.  The result of high inhaled levels of CO  will lower than deployed units.  Two of the tests of deployed apparatus2          2
be increased ventilation rates in most users. (units 14 and 18) showed wet-bulb temperatures much higher than
The O  gauge of one unit read 500 psi when empty.  Such an the others.  One treadmill test also showed a wet-bulb temperature2
incident would have no negative consequences unless an escaping as high.  These imply increased humidity resulting from the various
user decided to remain in an area with an irrespirable atmosphere chemical processes occurring within the bed and its interaction with
longer than necessary for some reason based on the gauge reading. the user.  Regardless of the cause and whether or not it resulted
CSE SR-100 minimal:  the inhaled wet-bulb temperatures never exceeded the
Seventeen of twenty deployed and three of four new apparatus Five deployed units reached 4% CO  before the O  supply was
passed the leak-tightness test. expended; all occurred before 60 min.  One of these was on a
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test for average inhaled CO  showed treadmill test; the others, the BMS (table 7).  One new unit tested2
a statistically significant difference between new and deployed on the BMS also experienced CO  breakthrough.
units, with deployed units having higher values than new ones Although the Wilcoxon rank-sum test showed that deployed
(table 4).  Table 6 shows that 16 of 20 units ex-perienced CO apparatus, as a group, did not differ with regard to CO  levels, the2
breakthrough before expenditure of the O  supply; 10 of these third BMS-tested deployed unit had much higher CO  levels than2
occurred before 60 min.  Of the new units, two of four experienced other deployed units, as can be seen in figure 9.  Average inhaled
premature breakthrough, but only by several minutes, and neither CO  levels reached 4% at 47 min and 14% at 60 min. 
before 60 min.  As mentioned above, the result of high inhaled
levels of CO  will be increased ventilation rates in most users.2
Increased ventilation rates will result in higher breathing pressures
experienced by the user.  Breathing pressures in the SR-100
increase rapidly toward end of life, even in new apparatus.
Elevated CO  levels will ac-celerate this r e.  The termination of2
one treadmill test (human subject C) at 55 min was for high
breathing pressures (%250 to &360 mm H O) even though there2
was sufficient volume in the breathing bag to permit continued use.
This occurred with minimum inhaled CO  levels of only 0.6%.2
Figure 8 shows higher breathing pressures in the human subject
2
2
with low CO  levels.  Either the test subject’s normal peak flow2
greater-than-average resistance.  BMS test 15 also exhibited greater-
2
from damage while deployed, the impact on a user would be
human tolerance level in any of the tests.







Table 5.—CSE AU-9A1 CO  breakthrough times, minutes2
Type of unit and test method
CO Final2
breakthrough termination






Deployed: Human subject on
   treadmill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 84
New:  BMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 84
70 93
75 91
Table 6.—CSE SR-100 CO  breakthrough times, minutes2
Type of unit and test method CO  breakthrough2
Final
termination
















New:  BMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 65
63 66
Table 7.—Draeger OXY-SR 60B CO  breakthrough2
 times, minutes
Type of unit and test method
CO Final2
breakthrough termination




Deployed:  Human subject on
  treadmill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 51
New:  BMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 70
This unit was carried and stored daily, as were most of the other
deployed units.
As with CO  levels, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test showed that2
deployed apparatus, as a group, did not differ from new units with
regard to exhalation pressures.  However, figure 9 shows units 13
and 14 having higher exhalation pressures than other deployed
units.  The pressures were normal (around 50 mm H O) up to2
50 min, then increased sharply.  By the end of the test at 70 min,
unit 13 reached 170 mm H O; unit 14 reached 430 mm H O at2       2
73 min.  Unit 14 would have challenged a wearer by the end.  The
second treadmill test had a similar exhaled pressure average.  All
three of these apparatus were the only ones with serial numbers in
the 32,000 range.  Whether or not the higher breathing resistances
were the result of damage suffered during deployment or of
manufacture or both, the user would have been impaired, if at all,
only at the end of the apparatus’ service life.  In the case of the
apparatus with the highest pressures, the user would have been
inclined 
to either modify his/her breathing or slow down to decrease peak
flow rates in order to continue use until the complete expenditure
of the O  supply.2
MSA PORTAL-PACK
Six of eight deployed and two of three new apparatus tested for
leaks passed.
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests showed that new units had
significantly higher inhalation pressures than deployed units.  This
would not negatively impact the user.
Six deployed units tested on the BMS reached 4% CO  before2
the O  supply was expended; two of these occurred before 60 min2
(table 8).  All three new units tested on the BMS also experienced
CO  breakthrough; two of these occurred before 60 min.2
Table 8.—MSA Portal-Pack CO  breakthrough times, minutes2
Type of unit and test method
CO  breakthrough Final2
termination






New:  BMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 71
 54 74
64 69
We discovered that the chlorate candles of some units emitted
a white smoke when activated.  This caused two con-cerns:  the
reaction of the user to the sight of the smoke and the composition
of the smoke.  The gas produced from the candles of several units
was sampled and analyzed by MSHA’s Physical and Toxic Agents
Div.  These opened and activated units were sealed for later testing
with manual starts; other than lower O  levels, they functioned2
satisfactorily as can be seen in figure 10.  Both particulate and
gaseous components were analyzed.  The particulate sample had
sodium and potassium salts as the primary contaminants.  In
addition, a barium salt, with an 8-h threshold limit value of 0.5
mg/m , was measured at 1.56 mg/m .  The gas analysis also3      3
detected an unquantified level of benzene.  NIOSH was notified of
our findings.  MSA performed its own gas analysis and detected
benzene in one sample, but in 
13
a concentration greatly below the short-term exposure limit.  We was reported to NIOSH and MSHA.  Ocenco now inspects 100%
are less concerned about the short-term exposure to these
contaminants than user response to visible white smoke.  MSA’s
training videotape mentions the possibility of smoke; the written
manual does not.  A special notification from the manufacturer will
be mailed to all users, or the manual will be updated to include
mention of the smoke.
OCENCO EBA 6.5
Four of 39 deployed apparatus tested for breathing circuit
tightness passed the leak test, while none of the three new apparatus
passed.  Many units passed the test when their relief valves were
capped, however, implying backflow through the valves.
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests showed that, in all categories, new
units could not be distinguished from deployed units.
The high inhalation pressures exhibited by some of the
apparatus on the BMS (figure 11) were caused by activation of the
demand valves, some of which are relatively stiff.  When the
demand valve is not required, the inhalation pressures are low,
reflecting low system resistance.  The demand valve is called into
use when the O  supply rate falls below the O  consumption rate.2      2
Whether and when this happens depends on the O  regulator and2
its factory setting, both of which can vary significantly.  The
average initial O  flow of the apparatus tested was 1.82 L/min2
ATPD, ranging from 1.53 to 3.66 L/min.  The 3.66-L/min flow
lowered somewhat after 10 min, such that the final duration for this
apparatus was 89 min.  Another apparatus (unit 28 in figure 11)
had an initial O  flow of 2.4 L/min, but this increased after 5 min,2
as evidenced by relief valve use; this resulted in a duration of
36 min.  The short duration and high O  flow rate resulted in low2
inhalation temperatures and high exhalation pressures, as can be
seen in figure 11.  This incident 
of the O  regulators.2
Sixteen deployed units tested on the BMS reached 4% CO2
before the O  supply was expended; none occurred before 60 min2
(table 9).  Several deployed units had much higher CO  levels than2
the rest, as can be seen in figure 11.  User response would be as
mentioned earlier.
Table 9.—Ocenco EBA 6.5 CO  breakthrough times, minutes2
Type of unit and test method CO  breakthrough2
Final
termination
















The O  gauges of two units read 500 and 1,000 psi when t ir2
cylinders were empty.
When the cylinder valve was opened on one unit to measure its
O  flow, there was a surge of O  such that the friction-fit2        2
connecting hose to the flow-measurement instrument was blown
off.  The O  gauge registered a 75-psi drop in cylinder pressure.2
This phenomenon did not recur when the cylinder valve was
reopened for testing.
CONCLUSIONS
The results of this fifth-phase SCSR test study at PRC suggest apparatus that possibly suffered extreme abuse and exhibited poor
that the large majority of SCSR's that pass their inspection criteriaperformance, yet passed inspection criteria.  Examples include a
can be relied upon to provide a safe level of life support capabilityDraeger OXY-SR 60B with high CO  levels (fig-
to allow miners to escape safely during a mine emergency. ure 9), another OXY-SR 60B with high exhalation pressures
However, the mining environment appears to have caused some (figure 9), and several Ocenco EBA 6.5's with high CO  levels
performance degradation in the CSE SR-100:  CO levels are (figure 11).  Although the Draeger OXY-SR 60B’s are no longer2 
higher in deployed units than new ones (table 4 and figure 8).  No in use, the Ocenco EBA 6.5's continue to be used and will be
statistically significant worsening in any performance category was monitored for further signs of deterioration.
detected in any other apparatus. The incidents with cylinder gauges on the CSE AU-9A1 and
Because the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, by its nature, detects small the Ocenco EBA 6.5 indicating 500 psi and higher with empty
changes in large numbers of units and tends to ignore large changes cylinders suggest that their accuracy should not be relied upon and
in small numbers of units, we should also pay attention to reaffirms that SCSR’s should be used only for emergency escape,




perceived remaining duration.  Apparatus should be worn until eliminated, this phenomenon must be clearly mentioned during
reaching safety, then removed. training.
The smoke sometimes emitted from the chlorate candle of the The short-duration Ocenco EBA 6.5 caused by the faulty O
MSA Portal-Pack may suggest that the apparatus isregulator shows the importance of 100% inspection of all critical
malfunctioning and lead the user to abandon it.  If not SCSR components.
2
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